Quad After the New Delhi Meeting: Force Multiplier or Consultative Forum?

The recent Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi produced a reaffirmation that the grouping remains relevant to its members. Yet the central strategic question facing the Quad — is it a genuine force multiplier in the Indo-Pacific or merely a consultative dialogue platform — remained unresolved. The meeting included foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the United States.

The rationale for the Quad is compelling. The Indo-Pacific hosts critical sea lanes that carry over 50 per cent of global trade and energy flow. China's rise, its coercive maritime behaviour and its growing technological dominance have created shared concerns among the four partners. The Quad first emerged informally after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, when India, Japan, Australia and the United States coordinated disaster relief. The formal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue began in 2007, lapsed for a decade, was revived in 2017, and has since produced annual ministerials and occasional summits.

Critics — including Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who has likened the Quad to 'sea foam' — argue that its momentum has sputtered. Each member has somewhat different priorities. Australia treats Quad as an extension of its alliance system; Japan sees it as a hedge against Chinese maritime assertiveness; the United States looks at it through the lens of strategic competition; and India insists on its strategic autonomy and uses the Quad alongside other groupings such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the I2U2.

Recent Quad efforts have shifted toward 'positive agenda' deliverables — vaccine diplomacy, maritime domain awareness, undersea cable security, semiconductor supply-chain resilience and critical-minerals partnerships. The New Delhi meeting on 26 May 2026 emphasised these tracks. For the Quad to become more than a consultative forum, members will need to back the rhetoric with co-financed projects and visible operational cooperation, including HADR and maritime surveillance exercises.