CPEC Explained: Why India Objects and How It Counters China in South Asia

In late May 2026, while New Delhi was getting ready to host the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan and Australia for a Quad meeting, China and Pakistan put out a joint statement of their own. One line in it drew a sharp Indian reaction. China said the Jammu and Kashmir issue was a leftover from history that should be resolved peacefully under the United Nations Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.

India's Ministry of External Affairs rejected this outright. Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said India "categorically rejects unwarranted references" to the region and described Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh as "integral and inalienable parts of India." He added that no other country has any standing to comment on the matter. The MEA also criticised the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), saying some of its projects pass through India's sovereign territory and that India opposes any moves by other countries to legitimise Pakistan's illegal occupation of that land.

These objections are not new, but they fit into a bigger story: how India has tried to push back against China's growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. For exam aspirants, this topic ties together geography, international relations and India's neighbourhood policy.

What is CPEC?

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a roughly 65 billion dollar set of projects between China and Pakistan. It is the flagship part of China's much larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global plan to build infrastructure and expand Chinese influence. CPEC was launched in 2015 and focuses on roads, railways, pipelines and ports. It links China's western Xinjiang region with Gwadar Port on Pakistan's coast along the Arabian Sea, through a network of about 3,000 km of highways, railroads and pipelines.

For China, CPEC offers a possible way to bring in oil and goods from West Asia without depending on the Strait of Malacca, a narrow shipping route in Southeast Asia that could be blocked during a conflict. The May 2026 joint statement said both sides plan to further develop Gwadar Port and the Karakoram Highway to boost trade. For the first time, the statement also invited third parties, meaning other countries or international investors, to take part in CPEC.

Why India objects

India's main objection is about sovereignty. The Karakoram Highway, a key CPEC route, passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which lies in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). India considers PoK to be Indian territory under Pakistan's illegal control. Because CPEC runs through this land without India's consent, India says the project violates its sovereignty. India also worries that letting outside investors join CPEC would only strengthen Pakistan's hold over PoK.

On the ground, CPEC has struggled. Many projects are unfinished, and experts say corruption and inefficiency in Pakistan have held it back, so the promised economic boom has not arrived.

The String of Pearls and India's counter-moves

Beyond sovereignty, India is concerned about China's wider maritime strategy, often called the "String of Pearls." This refers to a chain of ports and facilities China has invested in around the Indian Ocean, stretching from Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, through Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Myanmar, to the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. A port used by Chinese merchant ships today could serve Chinese navy vessels tomorrow. Gwadar also sits only about 400 km from the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of India's energy imports flow.

India has answered with its own set of moves. Its most direct response is supporting the Chabahar port in Iran, just 72 km from Gwadar. Chabahar gives India access to the Arabian Sea and a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan completely. India's involvement began in 2002, and a project agreement to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar was signed in 2015. The route connects with the Zaranj-Delaram road India built in Afghanistan. However, progress has been slow because of US sanctions on Iran, a recent sanctions waiver ended in April 2026, the conflict in West Asia has hurt prospects, and the latest Union Budget did not allocate funds for the port.

India has also gained military access to Duqm port in Oman in 2018, renewed in 2021, placing Indian naval assets across from Gwadar. In Sri Lanka, where China leased Hambantota port for 99 years in 2017, India signed a five-year defence cooperation agreement in 2025 and acquired a 51 percent stake in Colombo Dockyard through Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders. The government has also pushed the Great Nicobar Island project, though Opposition leaders and environmental activists have raised concerns about the environmental assessment, biodiversity and tribal groups. At the recent Quad meeting in New Delhi, the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) was launched for the Indian Ocean region.

The Quad has been criticised by China and has at times struggled to gain momentum because its members have different priorities. Even so, in the face of an assertive China, India and like-minded nations are likely to keep looking for ways to balance Chinese influence in the region.